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Exploiting Evolutionary Modeling to Prevail
in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments
Marco Gaudesi, Elio Piccolo, Giovanni Squillero, Senior Member, IEEE, Alberto Tonda
Abstract—The iterated prisoner’s dilemma is a famous model of
cooperation and conflict in game theory. Its origin can be traced
back to the Cold War, and countless strategies for playing it have
been proposed so far, either designed by hand or automatically
generated by computers. In the 2000s, scholars started focusing
on adaptive players, that is, able to classify their opponent’s
behavior and adopt an effective counter-strategy. The player
presented in this paper, pushes such idea even further: it builds a
model of the current adversary from scratch, without relying on
any pre-defined archetypes, and tweaks it as the game develops
using an evolutionary algorithm; at the same time, it exploits the
model to lead the game into the most favorable continuation.
Models are compact non-deterministic finite state machines;
they are extremely efficient in predicting opponents’ replies,
without being completely correct by necessity. Experimental
results show that such player is able to win several one-to-
one games against strong opponents taken from the literature,
and that it consistently prevails in round-robin tournaments of
different sizes.
Index Terms—evolutionary algorithms, iterated prisoner’s
dilemma, non-deterministic finite state machine, opponent mod-
eling.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE prisoner’s dilemma is a renowned model of cooper-ation and conflict in game theory. In its simplest form,
it describes an interaction between two players whose final
outcome is determined by the choices of both. There are only
two possible moves: C and D. If both players choose C, they
earn a high reward; if both play D, they get only a low reward.
If one chooses C and the other D, the latter obtains a very
high reward, while the former endures a very low reward or no
reward at all [?]. It is a nonzero-sum game, because whatever
benefit accrues to one player does not necessarily imply the
same penalty imposed on the other player. The model was
originally devised in 1950 by the mathematicians Merrill
Flood and Melvin Dresher for simulating world leaders’
struggle between peaceful coexistence and nuclear aggression.
The study was part of the RAND1 Corporation’s research into
game theory and its applications to global nuclear strategy [?].
To make the idea more accessible to psychologists, a few
years later Albert Tucker labeled the problem “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” and described it with the following metaphor: two
criminals are arrested for an offense and placed in separate
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isolation cells; each of two prisoners is offered freedom in
exchange for implicating the other. If neither does, they will
receive the usual sentence; however, if both prisoners accuse
each other, they are granted moderately harsh sentences.
In such metaphor, negating the involvement is “cooper-
ating”, corresponds to move C, and represents the selfless
and peaceful behavior; betraying the ex-partner is “defecting”,
corresponds to D, and symbolizes the selfish and aggressive
behavior. That is, the most favorable situation is to confess
while the partner is negating any involvement, and the least
favorable one is to be betrayed while resisting the police’s
pressure.
Let R (reward) be the payoff for a mutual cooperation, and
P (punishment) the payoff if both players defect; when only
one player acts selfishly, its payoff is T (temptation), and the
payoff of its opponent is S (sucker). The Prisoner’s Dilemma
model requires that2:
T > R > P > S (1)
R >
S+T
2
(2)
and the most common payoff matrix found in literature sets
T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0.
According to equation (1), in a single turn of the prisoner’s
dilemma the selfish move always dominates the selfless one:
if one of the players cooperates, the most profitable decision
for the other is to exploit his good faith and defect; on the
other hand, if a player defects, the best counteraction for the
opponent is, again, to be selfish and minimize the damage.
Therefore, the situation has no strategic interest. Similarly,
using the technique of backward induction, it may be inferred
that the optimal strategy in a game of known length is to
always defect [?].
Quite differently, in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD)
two players face the previously described situation for an
unknown, potentially infinite number of turns with memory of
the previous exchanges. Here the model changes significantly:
repeatedly defecting is definitely not the optimal strategy, and
equation (2) discourages from alternating between cooperation
and defection. As a matter of fact, the single-shot game is so
uninteresting, that frequently in literature the term “prisoner’s
dilemma” refers to the iterated version.
2In game theory, payoffs are positive and the objective is to maximize the
reward. However, since in Tucker’s formulation the final goal was minimizing
a prison sentence, equations (1) and (2) can be found reversed in some
textbooks.
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Despite its simplicity, or perhaps because of its simplicity,
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma proved to be an excellent
model of many real-life situations, from animal behaviors
to economic strategies. Scientific contributions on the topic
appear regularly in various fields, from theoretical biology to
mathematics, game theory, and computer sciences. Moreover,
many variants of the basic model appeared and have been
studied over the years. For instance: in the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma, individuals could only mate and play with their
neighbors in a lattice or other structure [?]; in the evolutionary
IPD, a population of strategies plays IPD with one another and
each strategy has the chance to produce offspring proportional
to its payoff [?]; moreover the idea of a topological structure
may be used in the evolutionary analysis [?]. In the N-person
prisoner’s dilemma, the game is extended to multiple players
[?]; while in the shopkeeper model, a player interacts with a
series of opponents without resetting its internal state, simu-
lating a shopkeeper that interacts with a series of customers
[?].
Robert Axelrod, a political scientist at the University of
Michigan, was the first to attempt searching for efficient
strategies using competitions. In 1979 he organized an IPD
tournament soliciting strategies from game theorists who al-
ready published in the field, and, soon after, ran a second
round of the same tournament with a slightly modified setup
[?]. Since then, new tournaments have been held regularly.
Interestingly, while original works aimed at studying the
emerging cooperation, after three decades scholars are also
focusing on the emerging exploitation, that is, strategies that
succeed at the expense of their opponents [?].
Defining a fixed strategy able to overcome all possible oppo-
nents in such tournaments has been demonstrated impossible.
Some researchers tried to find strategies averagely effective
against a varied set of adversaries; others developed strategies
able to recognize and team-up with member of the same kin.
Scholars also proposed adaptive strategies able to shape their
behavior according to the opponent’s actions. Some adaptive
players record a statistic of their opponent’s moves to find
the most profitable action: a first-order distribution probability
is often used to determine the expected payoff for defection
and cooperation, possibly smoothed with heuristics. Other
adaptive players try to categorize the opponent using rule-
based mechanisms to play the best counter strategy [?].
In a recent line of research, the idea of categorizing the
opponent was pushed further: instead of choosing from a set
of predetermined archetypes, the player builds a model of the
opponent from scratch using evolutionary computation. The
heuristic optimizer is used not to generate a strategy before
the game, but to tweak the strategy during the game. This
idea was tested with two players: Laran3 in 2011 [?]; and
Turan3 in 2014 [?].
Building on these experiences, this paper presents Tages3, an
evolutionary player that tries to predict the opponent’s future
moves in order to select the most profitable line of play. Tages
models the opponent’s strategy as a non-deterministic finite
3All names are taken from the Etruscan mythology: Laran is the god of
war, Turan his consort, and Tages a deity gifted with prescience.
automaton; considering the record of past moves and simple
heuristics, it is able to build effective representations. Tages
requires no training nor preparation to face new opponents:
the internal model is built ab initio and tweaked as the game
develops.
Experimental results show that the proposed methodology is
able to win standard round-robin tournaments, outperforming
both deterministic and non-deterministic strategies. Moreover,
the models are highly functional as their predictions are
fulfilled more than 90% of the times against most opponents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II
contains a brief summary of relevant strategies developed for
past tournaments; section III gives an overview of the proposed
approach, while sections IV and V detail the modeling and the
playing units; section VI shows the experimental evaluaton;
finally, section VII concludes the paper.
II. IPD STRATEGIES
Back in 1979, during the first tournament organized by
Robert Axelrod, each player was matched against all others
in round-robin over a sequence of 200 turns, and the total
payoff collected during all games was considered as the final
score. Fourteen strategies were submitted, and Axelrod himself
added a fifteenth strategy that cooperated and defected with
equal probability. The competition was won by Tit for Tat,
a deceptively simple strategy created by the Russian-born
American mathematical psychologist Anatol Rapoport. Tit for
Tat cooperates on the first turn and then mimics the opponent’s
choice in the previous turn.
Soon after, Axelrod ran a second round of the tournament.
He adopted the same round-robin scheme, but, to prevent
the use of backward induction, the length of games was not
disclosed in advance. On the contrary, he set a probability
p = 0.00346 for each turn to conclude the game. Sixty-two
entries were submitted, and Tit for Tat claimed the first place
once again [?].
Tit for Tat was the simplest strategy submitted to the
tournament, and it won both rounds. Even though all the
participants perfectly knew who had won the first round, no
one was able to design an entry that did any better in the
second. Under a closer examination, this is not surprising:
Tit for Tat never defects first, it is never taken advantage
of more than once without retribution, and it is swift in
forgiving. Rapoport’s strategy soon became an important point
of reference in IPD studies, both to evaluate and to classify
new strategies. Being able to outperform Tit for Tat in a
tournament is still a challenge, as a player specifically tweaked
to overcome it is likely to lose many points against the other
participants.
Over the years, new players for the IPD have been both
carefully crafted by hand, and automatically generated by
machines. Their descriptions are scattered through scientific
literature and dedicated Internet web sites4. Among the many
different approaches to automatically devise effective strate-
gies, genetic algorithms have been exploited since the very
beginning [?]. Scientific literature also reports the use of
4See for example http://www.prisoners-dilemma.com/strategies.html
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several nature-inspired heuristics, such as evolutionary pro-
gramming [?], particle swarm optimization [?] or artificial
neural networks [?]. An insightful survey on evolutionary-
based approaches can be found in [?], but the field is very
active and new contributions are appearing regularly. More
conventional techniques, such as Q-Learning [?], have also
been applied to the task.
Finite state machines (FSMs) have been commonly em-
ployed to represent strategies for the IPD. They are a com-
promise between simplicity and expressiveness, as they can
represent very complex Markov models [?]. Most of the works
use Moore machines, i.e., FSMs whose output value is deter-
mined by the current state, only, while a few utilized Mealy
machines, where the output is a function of the current state
and input5. In modern strategies, however, the output is not
always a deterministic function of the input because players
make use of random number generators. Moreover, whenever
strategies exploit lookup tables, counters, or floating-point
variables, FSMs become, if not inadequate, at least unpractical,
because the number of states would be enormous.
While facing the problem of creating effective strategies,
scholars also tackled the problem of classifying strategy’s
behavior. In 2000s, fingerprinting6 has emerged as an effective
analysis tool independent from the representation [?] [?]. A
more comprehensive survey on the topic may be found in
Jeffrey Tsang’s 2014 Ph.D. dissertation7. Common strategies
are here classified informally into four, intuitive broad groups.
For the detailed description of each one see Appendix A.
1) Dummy Strategies: This group contains trivial players
that are commonly considered as a testbed to assess the effi-
cacy of complex strategies. For instance, strategies that blindly
repeat a fixed sequence of moves, or strategies that base their
choice on pure randomness. Remarkably, while these strategies
are trivial to describe, adding them to a tournament may bias
the results, and finding an optimal strategy against all of them
is not always straightforward.
2) Tit for Tat and Derivative Strategies: This group con-
tains the original Tit for Tat and other strategies that have been
directly derived from it. It also includes Reverse Tit for Tat, a
player that retaliates by cooperating if the opponent defected
in the previous turn.
3) Group Strategies: Group strategies assume the presence
of other players of the same kin in the tournament. They aim
at recognizing each other and increase their payoff [?]. If the
opponent is not identified as a member of the team, sometimes
they play as Tit for Tat, or sometimes as Always Defect.
One famous example is the strategy devised by researchers
at the Southampton School of Electronics and Computer Sci-
ence: they submitted to the same tournament over 60 players
able to recognize each other with an initial handshake and
then collude, raising the score of selected members of their
5Moore and Mealy machines are equivalent formalism: it is trivial to
translate a FSM from one representation to the other by adding or removing
states.
6A treatise of fingerprinting can be found in Eun-Youn Kim’s Ph.D.
dissertation: E. Y. Kim. Fingerprinting: Automatic Analysis of Evolved Game
Playing Agents. Ph.D. Thesis, Iowa State University, 2005
7J. Tsang. The Structure of the Space of All Game-Playing Strategies.
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Guelph, 2014
team, while lowering the score of other players with endless
defections. As a result, members of the squad gained the first
three positions in the tournament8.
4) Adaptive Strategies: While most of the players do take
into account the opponent’s behavior, players in this group
are able to drastically change their strategy as a result of an
explicit evaluation of the opponent. Several strategies in this
group also stem from Tit for Tat, like Omega Tit for Tat [?].
A truly remarkable example is Jiawei Li’s Adaptive Pavlov
[?], that uses a rule-based mechanism to switch between three
possible behaviors, namely Tit for Tat, Soft Tit for Two Tats,
and Always Defect.
An idea common to many adaptive strategies is to explore
and exploit. In the former phase the opponent is tested, while
in the second the best counter strategy is adopted. Usually the
first phase lasts a predetermined number of turns, and may be
repeated cyclically or upon a drop in performance. Since the
2000s, such adaptive strategies consistently ranked very high
in IPD tournaments [?], [?].
5) Zero-determinant Strategies: Zero-determinant (ZD)
strategies entered the scene of the IPD in 2010s when William
Press and Freeman Dyson showed the unexpected existence of
ultimatum strategies [?]. Such strategies impose an ultimatum
to the opponent, forcing it to concede points with the threat
of defection. They impose a certain relationship between their
score and the opponent’s, first choosing their target objective,
and consequently deriving their probabilities of cooperating or
defecting.
ZD strategies were proved to be evolutionary unstable by
Christoph Adami and Arend Hintze [?]; few months later,
however, Alexander Stewart and Joshua Plotkin demonstrated
that the subset labeled “generous ZD strategies” is stable in
large populations [?].
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
This paper presents Tages, an adaptive IPD player based on
opponent modeling. Its goal is to take the most of its adversary
by leading the game into a profitable line of exchanges. To this
end, it builds a model of the strategy it is facing, although the
primary goal for such a model is to be functional rather to be
exact: Tages does not need to model an opponent exactly in
order to deal with it optimally.
Tages is conceptually composed of two distinct blocks: a
modeling unit, based on an evolutionary optimizer; and a play-
ing unit, based on a brute-force algorithm (Fig. 1). Each turn,
the modeling unit updates a coherent, competitive and compact
model of the opponent. The process is not based on any
assumptions about the adversary, such as a list of established
strategies to choose from, but creates the model from scratch.
Then, the playing unit retrieves the model, replays the current
game, simulates all possible 2M continuations of M moves,
and selects the one that provides the highest payoff. The
playing unit eventually selects the first move in this sequence.
In rare occasions, however, it rather exploits simple heuristics
instead of the brute force analysis (see Section V for details).
8University of Southampton team wins Prisoner’s Dilemma competition
http://www.southampton.ac.uk/mediacentre/news/2004/oct/04 151.shtml
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Fig. 1. The general architecture of Tages.
As said before, it may not be practical to describe a complex
strategy with a simple FSM. Tages, therefore, models its
opponent as a non-deterministic finite state machine (ND-
FSM), sometimes called non-deterministic finite automata9. In
a model, transitions are always triggered by Tages’ move, but
the same input symbol may cause a transition to two or more
states. Such non-determinism is used to express uncertainty
in a compact form: the opponent sometimes behaves in a
certain way, sometimes behaves differently. Additionally, the
initial state might not be unique, as different behaviors can be
recorded from the very first turns10. See Fig. 2 for an example,
and the explanation of the keys used in the rest of the paper.
In the text, the following terminology is adopted: the
sequence of moves played by Tages defines the path, and the
moves performed by opponents are the footprints left while
walking on the path, each turn representing a single step.
Considering the game record, the footprints are the sequence
of moves played by the actual opponent. While modeling an
opponent, differently, the footprints left by a candidate model
are all the possible sequences of moves that it could have
played given Tages’ fixed ones. Thus, models are likely to
leave footprints composed of more and more sequences as
their non-determinism increases.
IV. MODELING UNIT
Tages exploits an evolutionary algorithm (EA) to build
and optimize the model of the opponent’s behavior. The EA
handles a population of µ individuals, each one a candidate
model encoded as a ND-FSM. Each generation, the EA goes
through the standard phases: reproduction, the creation of off-
spring; evaluation, the evaluation of new individuals; removal,
9A ND-FSM is a FSM that (i) does not necessarily require input symbols
for state transitions and/or (ii) is capable of transitioning to two or more states
for a given start state and input symbol. ND-FSM and FSM are equivalent
formalisms [?] [?].
10A ND-FSM with multiple initial states can be easily translated to a
ND-FSM with single initial state.
Fig. 2. An example of ND-FSM. States are numbered starting from 0.
The output is “cooperation” (C) in states drawn with a double border, and
“defection” (D) otherwise. The letter on each transition indicates the triggering
opponent’s move. The bold arrow with no label and no antecedent points to
the initial state. This ND-FSM is a model of Generous Tit-for-Tat built by
Tages during a game: nodes 1 and 2 encode the standard Tit-for-Tat, while
node 0 enables it not to retaliate at once. Evidently, during the game it forgave
Tages’ first deception but not the second.
the removal from the population of less fit individuals. The
optimization process is stopped after G generations, or after
1
2G generations without improvement.
A. Initialization
Before the first generation, 5µ individuals are created from
scratch: they are made of exactly ι states, their outputs and
the transitions between them are randomly chosen. Then, with
a small probability, additional transitions are added, possibly
generating a non-deterministic strategy. Eventually, the most
competitive and compact µ are kept as the initial population
(see IV-E for details on how individuals are evaluated).
B. Reproduction
In the reproduction phase, the size of the population is
doubled creating µ new individuals. With probability p = 14
Tages generates the offspring through recombination of two
parents; with probability p = 34 through the mutation of a
single parent (for details on the selection mechanism, see
IV-F).
There is only one recombination operator that simply juxta-
poses the ND-FSMs of the two parents, maintaining the initial
states of both. As a result, the offspring may behave either as
one parent or as the other. There are nine mutation operators,
and Tages selects which one to apply with a probability biased
by their performance, that is, the number of individuals in the
current population that have been created by that operator.
Individuals with no parents are considered created by all
operators, so, in the first generation, all selection probabilities
are the same.
In more details, the nine mutation operators may: change
one of the initial states of the ND-FSM; add a non-initial state
to the set of initial states – thus increasing the overall non-
determinism; remove a state from the set of initial states –
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thus decreasing the overall non-determinism; add a state with
a random output and two random transitions, then connect
the state to the ND-FSM adding a new non-deterministic
transition from a random preexisting state – thus increasing
the overall non-determinism; remove a state along with all its
ingoing/outgoing transitions; change the destination state of
a transition; switch the output of a state from “cooperate”
to “defect” or vice-versa; add an outgoing transition to a
state – thus increasing the overall non-determinism; remove
an outgoing transition from a state which has two or more
transitions triggered by the same event – thus decreasing the
overall non-determinism.
There are several operators that increase the size in the
offspring, as there are several different ways to do it, but
bigger models are likely to receive lower fitness and self-
adapting activation probabilities reduces the bloating phe-
nomenon. Moreover, some mutations may fail, i.e., not be able
to produce an offspring. For instance, RemoveInitialState is
bound to fail if there is only one initial state in the ND-FSM.
In such cases, no individuals are added to the population.
C. Extinction
Premature convergence is a taxing problem in evolutionary
computation. Moreover, in Tages the fitness is dynamic, and
all individuals in the population may suddenly become almost
useless because no one is able to model the last move of the
opponent. To escape such a situation, the modeling unit makes
use of Extinction, a well-known technique where a large part
of the population is suddenly killed and replaced with new
solutions [?].
Tages resorts to extinction if it is not able to enhance
the best solution for 13G generations. When the condition
is met, instead of the normal reproduction phase, 45 of the
individuals are removed from the current population, and new
5µ individuals are added. Such individuals are created from
scratch as before the first generation (see IV-A), consequently,
the result is also to reduce the gaps between the different
operator activation probabilities.
Finally, all individuals in such an abnormally large pop-
ulation are evaluated, and the best µ preserved for the next
generation.
D. Evaluation and Removal
In these phases, Tages first evaluates all new individuals,
then removes the less fit from the population until its size
reaches back µ.
E. Fitness Function
Candidate models are ranked according to their coherence
with the game record, general competitiveness, and compact-
ness. That is, to be functional a model is requested to adhere
with the game so far, to describe a strong opponent, and to be
general and tractable.
The first requirement is essential for the model to be
sensibly used to predict the future continuation of the game.
The second requirement was introduced in Laran [?]: it
sounds reasonable to assume that the opponent is strong when
devising a strategy against it. The third pushes Tages to create
expressive models at the expense of exactness.
1) Coherence: The coherence could be defined as the
amount of overlapping between the footprints of the model
and the moves recorded during the game. It should measure
whether a model can be used to predict the future development
of the game, or how far it is from being able to do it.
While fingerprinting and multilateration could be theoretically
used for the second task [?], it would not answer the first
question. Moreover an explicit evaluation is not practical as
the number of sequences composing the footprints of a ND-
FSM increase exponentially over the length of the path. Tages
resorts to two measures to approximate an exact coherence
called respectively plausibility and likelihood.
The plausibility (P) measures the tail of the game sequence
that can be found in the strategy’s footprints. It is a real num-
ber, P ∈ [0, 1]. If the entire sequence is found in the footprints,
then P = 1. Otherwise the ND-FSM representing the strategy
is simulated starting from the last turn; transitions are played
backwards, dropping states with mismatching outputs until no
more state is active; and the final value of P is proportional
to the number of steps.
The plausibility does not measure how many sequences in
the footprints correspond to the sequence of moves actually
played in the game, nor it takes into consideration the total
size of the footprints. However, with complexity O(s) for a
game of length s, it assesses whether the considered model
could have produced the correct sequence; and if not, it gives
a rough approximation of how close it is to producing that
sequence.
The likelihood (L) of a given model θ is the opposite
of the logarithm of the zero-order probability that in turn i
the model plays the same move recorded in the game Gi,
summed up over all turns in the game11. The likelihood is a
positive number, L ∈ [0,+∞], the smaller the better. Steps
are weighted to give slightly more relevance to recent moves
over the ones played in the beginning of the game (ξ > 1):
L(θ) = −
∑
i
ξi · log(P (θi = Gi))
Where the probability P (θi = Gi) for the model θ to match
the action Gi after the previous G1...Gi−1 moves is:
P (θi = Gi) =
naction
ntotal
where naction is the number of current states returning
action Gi, while ntotal is the total number of states the ND-
FSM is in at the moment.
The likelihood can be calculated with complexity O(s) for
a game of length s, but it is an imprecise measure since it does
not take into consideration sequences. For instance, the foot-
prints of a non-deterministic player that could behave either
as an Always Defect or as an Always Cooperate are composed
of two sequences: a sequence of uninterrupted cooperations,
and a sequence of uninterrupted defections. However, such
11More precisely, this value should be called log likelihood [?].
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a strategy would get exactly the same likelihood value on
any path, as the zero-order probabilities for cooperation and
defection are always the same (∀i : P (θi = Gi) = 12 ).
2) Competitiveness: The competitiveness (C) measures the
performances of the strategy against some sparring partners. It
is a positive integer number, C ∈ [0,+∞], the larger the better.
Tages employs only two adversaries: a player that cooperates
with a probability equal to the frequency of cooperations in
its opponent record; and a player that behaves like Tit for Tat
nine times out of ten, and otherwise choses the opposite move.
The ND-FSM describing the model is matched for nine
games of length of 100, 200, . . . , 900 against each opponent,
and the competitiveness is the total payoff earned. Whenever
the strategy prescribes more than one transition for the same
input symbol, one is chosen randomly with flat probability.
As a consequence, games may be non reproducible, and
the competitiveness should be considered as a noisy fitness
function.
3) Compactness: The compactness (X ) takes into account
both the size and the amount of non determinism of the ND-
FSM. Is is a positive real value, X ∈ [0,+∞], the smaller the
better. The individual is simulated using the path as input. For
each node that has been visited at least once in the last 20% of
the steps, a low penalty (e = 1) is considered; for each other
node that has been visited at least once in the last 50% of
the steps, a medium penalty is considered (e = 5); nodes that
have been visited only in the first 50% of the path contribute
with a high penalty (e = 10). A maximum penalty (e = 20) is
associated to isolated nodes, i.e., nodes that cannot be reached
regardless of the path. All penalties factors are summed up and
multiplied by the total number sequences in the footprints.
Whether a model has a number of states higher than a
threshold ζ, it is considered not usable, regardless its plau-
sibility. After the initial turns, the value of ζ is equal to
the percentage of correct predictions achieved by the model:
that is, a model that is able to correctly foresee 75% of the
opponent’s responses is allowed to contain up to 75 states.
The rationale is quite simple: if the model is precise, it may
be also complex; but if the model is not functional it is better
to increase its generality than its size.
F. Selection
In order to be usable, a model must be fully plausible
(P = 1) and the number of states in it must be less than ζ.
Individuals are chosen for reproduction through tournaments
of size τ . First of all, if only one candidate is usable it is
preferred. If both or neither are usable, the two candidates are
compared on all aspects of the fitness: P , L, C, and X .
Comparison is performed using the chromatic operator [?]:
with a random wheel selection weighted on the relative dif-
ference between corresponding fitness values; in other words,
fitness components for which the two individual differ the most
have a higher probability of being selected for comparison.
V. PLAYING UNIT
The playing unit exploits the best model devised by the
modeling unit, and select the next move to be played by
Tages. Finally, if the model is reliable, the most probable
opponent’s reply is stored as the “prediction”, and used to
calculate statistics (see sections IV-E3 and VI).
A. Brute-force Analysis
First, the current game is replayed up to the current turn to
detect the set of possible current states of the ND-FSM. To
perform predictions, a model must be fully plausible (P = 1),
that is, the set of possible current states cannot be empty.
Then, using a brute force approach, all 2M possible contin-
uations of M moves are simulated. The simulation takes into
account non-determinism: whenever the model may behave
differently, the average payoff for the step is used. Then, the
sequence yielding the highest payoff is taken, and the first
move is selected.
B. Exploration
With a very small probability p = θ, the unit does not play
the move selected by the brute-force analysis, but its opposite,
to explore the opponent’s behavior.
C. Random Move
If the model is not able to replay the current game, that
is, P < 1, the unit selects a random move. The probability
of choosing “cooperation” is equal to the fraction of the total
reward received so far when cooperating.
D. Reconciliation
To break long sequences of mutual defections, there is
a probability to attempt a reconciliation, that is, to play a
sequence of cooperations ignoring opponent’s replies. Such
probability p = n · ρ is proportional to the length n of the
sequence, and a coefficient ρ that is scaled down by ten after
each reconciliation attempt. The length of the sequence is
selected with uniform probability between 4 and 10.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Tages was implemented in the Go programming language,
and consists of about 5,000 lines of code. The source code
is publicly available from Bitbucket12. The parameters used
during the evaluations are shown in Table I.
The effectiveness of Tages was first assessed with testbeds,
then its performance in typical tournaments was evaluated.
The standard payoff matrix was adopted: T = 5, R = 3,
P = 1, and S = 0. In the first sets of experiments, all matches
consisted of one game, that lasts exactly 200 turns. When
simulating tournaments, each strategy was confronted with all
the others in a round-robin fashion. Matches were composed
of 5 games of exactly 168, 359, 306, 622, and 319 turns.
The lengths, precomputed using Axelrod’s rules, are also the
default in the well-known software Oyun [?]. However, no
strategy took advantage of this knowledge. Each evaluation
has been repeated 10 times with different random seeds.
12https://bitbucket.org/squillero/tages
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The experiments consider the efficacy of the models, and
either the total payoff or the average payoff per turn. For all,
both the average over ten runs and the standard deviation is
reported. The “efficacy” is measured as the fraction of turns
where the prediction is correct over the total. That is, the ratio
of turns where the modeling unit yields a model fully coherent
with the game played so far, and the very same model is
correct in anticipating the next opponent’s move (see section
V). Thus, values can be as low as zero.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS USED IN TAGES FOR RUNNING ALL THE EXPERIMENTS.
Param Value Description
µ 100 Population/offspring size
G 300 Maximum number of generations
θ 0.01 Probability to explore the model
ρ 0.1 Initial reconciliation factor
ι 5 Size of the initial random models
A. Preliminary Assessment
The first set of experiments confronts Tages with players
of the Dummy group, that is, players that act blindly without
considering opponents’ moves. Table II shows five players that
repeat a predefined sequence, and eleven random players Rδ
that cooperate with probability p = δ. R1.00 and R0.00 also
belong to the first group, and correspond to Always Cooperate
and Always Defect. The player with δ = 12 defects and
cooperates with equal probability, and it is sometimes called
Random.
For each opponent, the table reports the average payoff
earned in each turn and the efficacy of the model over ten
runs. For each parameter, both the average value (P ) and the
standard deviation (Pσ) are reported. With such simple op-
ponents, it is straightforward to calculate the optimal average
payoff per turn (Popt), and the information is shown last in
the column block. The third column block reports the efficacy
of the model: average (E) and standard deviation (Eσ).
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE AGAINST “DUMMY” STRATEGIES: AVERAGE PAYOFF PER
TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OVER
10 GAMES). OPPONENTS NAMED Rp PLAY RANDOMLY, COOPERATING
WITH PROBABILITY p.
Opponent name Payoff Model
P Pσ Popt E Eσ
CD 2.91 0.04 3.00 0.99 0.00
CCD 3.57 0.02 3.67 0.97 0.01
DDC 2.19 0.02 2.33 0.97 0.01
R1.0 (AC) 4.98 0.01 5.00 1.00 0.00
R0.9 4.54 0.18 4.60 0.46 0.22
R0.8 3.97 0.26 4.20 0.33 0.18
R0.7 3.43 0.44 3.80 0.12 0.06
R0.6 2.92 0.14 3.40 0.14 0.08
R0.5 (RND) 2.68 0.24 3.00 0.11 0.10
R0.4 2.14 0.17 2.60 0.16 0.04
R0.3 1.83 0.12 2.20 0.14 0.08
R0.2 1.51 0.11 1.80 0.25 0.06
R0.1 1.01 0.15 1.40 0.56 0.05
R0.0 (AD) 0.86 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.00
Since the behavior of such opponents cannot be influenced,
the optimal line of action is to always defect. As it could
be expected, the accuracy of the predictions is very high
when the model is fully deterministic and decreases sharply
as randomness increases.
As a matter of fact the performance of Tages are within
10% of the optimum for opponents with δ ∈]0, 0.5[, and fall
down to −23% for opponents with δ ∈ [0.5, 1[. The program
is far more effective with the first half of players because
such players are more likely to get a good score in a generic
tournament, and Tages assumes that its opponents are strong.
In the second experiment Tages is confronted with unreli-
able Tit-for-Tat opponents. Such strategies act as the original
Rapoport’s with probability p = α, while they chose the
opposite move with probability p = 1−α. As in the previous
test bench, the first and last are deterministic, and correspond
respectively to Tit for Tat and Reverse Tit for Tat. Table III
reports, for each opponent, the average payoffs earned in each
turn, and the efficacy of the model.
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE AGAINST RANDOMIZED TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGIES:
AVERAGE PAYOFFS PER TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND
STANDARD DEVIATION OVER 10 GAMES). STRATEGIES PLAY “TIT FOR
TAT” WITH PROBABILITY α, AND “REVERSE TIT FOR TAT” OTHERWISE.
α
Tages Opponent Model
P Pσ P Pσ E Eσ
1.0 (TFT) 2.96 0.01 2.96 0.01 0.98 0.00
0.9 2.46 0.14 2.62 0.25 0.65 0.21
0.8 2.21 0.05 1.96 0.17 0.25 0.13
0.7 2.30 0.12 1.85 0.42 0.23 0.13
0.6 2.46 0.16 1.54 0.43 0.11 0.07
0.5 2.63 0.28 1.51 0.54 0.10 0.04
0.4 2.84 0.22 1.30 0.34 0.09 0.04
0.3 3.40 0.21 0.79 0.17 0.08 0.04
0.2 3.71 0.26 0.69 0.26 0.12 0.07
0.1 4.16 0.49 0.46 0.37 0.47 0.28
0.0 (RTFT) 4.92 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.98 0.00
As seen in the previous experiment, Tages is able to build
highly efficient models against deterministic players, and it is
understandably unable to predict the actions of random ones.
Solving the relevant Bellman equations, it may be proven
that the best strategy is AC when α > 0.8; CD when
α ∈ [ 23 , 0.8]; and AD when α < 23 (see Jeffrey Tsang’s 2014
Ph.D. dissertation for details7). Tages’ Performances are nearly
optimal against deterministic players, and are generally better
when playing against adversaries more similar to Tit for Tat
than Reverse Tit for Tat.
B. Tit for Tat and Derivatives
Table IV reports the results against common players derived
from Rapoport’s Tit for Tat (for details see Appendix A).
Differently from the first set, adversaries listed here do have
their own “strategy”, and the modeling unit can therefore be
effectively exploited.
The accuracy of the prediction is linked to the amount of
intrinsic randomness of the strategies. Some of these players
can be fooled by an alternated sequence of cooperation and
defection, such as TF2T and HTF2T, and Tages exploits this
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE AGAINST “TIT-FOR-TAT” STRATEGIES: AVERAGE PAYOFFS
PER TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION
OVER 10 GAMES).
Opponent name Tages Opponent Model
P Pσ P Pσ E Eσ
2TFT 2.89 0.04 2.98 0.02 0.97 0.01
ATFT 3.10 0.29 2.34 0.23 0.88 0.07
CTFT 3.00 0.00 2.77 0.18 0.99 0.00
GTFT  = 0.05 2.94 0.04 2.92 0.07 0.97 0.02
GTFT  = 0.1 2.89 0.20 2.83 0.27 0.92 0.14
GTFT  = 0.33 2.89 0.11 2.41 0.55 0.70 0.33
HTF2T 3.77 0.06 1.61 0.03 0.97 0.00
HTFT2 2.88 0.04 2.97 0.02 0.97 0.01
HTFT3 2.84 0.07 3.00 0.03 0.96 0.01
NP 2.48 0.13 2.85 0.12 0.82 0.13
NPM 2.94 0.05 2.94 0.06 0.97 0.03
OTFT 1.89 1.04 2.29 0.65 0.96 0.02
RP  = 0.01 2.91 0.07 2.94 0.07 0.97 0.01
RP  = 0.1 2.44 0.12 2.63 0.19 0.67 0.18
RTFT 4.92 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.98 0.00
STFT 2.94 0.03 2.96 0.03 0.99 0.00
TF2T 3.88 0.04 1.56 0.02 0.97 0.00
TFT 2.96 0.01 2.96 0.01 0.98 0.00
weakness. Others require sequences of cooperations, and, yet
again, Tages is able to produce them.
The player Hard Tit for Tat with a window of three is a
paradigmatic example: Tages is able to predict its behavior
96% of the times, and select the best line of play, although the
model is seldom exact (Fig. VI-B). On a closer examination,
all ND-FSMs include three states where the opponent defects.
Tages shows no interest in determining exactly how these three
states are connected, because against all models the best option
is to always cooperate, and this is correct.
Strategies derived from Tit for Tat that are also adaptive will
be discussed in the following.
C. Adaptive opponents
Table V reports the results against common adaptive players
(for details see Appendix A). While able to adapt their own
strategy to the opponent’s, these players are definitely rational.
Thus, it should not be a surprise that the performance of the
modeling unit is particularly good.
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE AGAINST WELL-KNOWN “ADAPTIVE” STRATEGIES:
AVERAGE PAYOFFS PER TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND
STANDARD DEVIATION OVER 10 GAMES).
Strategy Tages Opponent Model
P Pσ P Pσ E Eσ
ADP 0.97 0.03 1.49 0.12 0.98 0.00
APAV 1.89 0.78 2.41 0.50 0.79 0.20
ATFT 3.26 0.21 2.28 0.31 0.92 0.05
CTFT 3.00 0.00 2.83 0.13 0.99 0.00
FBF 3.00 0.00 2.83 0.11 0.99 0.00
GRD 2.82 0.14 2.96 0.06 0.93 0.04
HM 2.72 1.18 1.85 0.47 0.97 0.04
OTFT 1.85 1.07 2.24 0.70 0.96 0.02
PAV 4.97 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.99 0.00
SG 2.91 0.04 2.97 0.02 0.97 0.01
SM 3.59 0.20 1.80 0.16 0.95 0.03
Several strategies may turn to Always Defect upon certain
conditions, and Tages models this fact through a sink state.
Omega Tit for Tat is a paradigmatic example: depending on
the beginning of the game, it may play an endless sequence of
defections. Whether this is the case, the only viable option for
Tages is to defect as well; however, other times, OTFT adopts a
TFT-like strategy. The direction taken by the game is randomly
determined in the first moves. The two typical models built by
Tages are shown in Fig. 4. The standard deviation, remarkably
higher than in other experiments, is coherent with the analysis.
Table VI reports the results against the zero-determinant
strategies (for details see Appendix A). As expected, Tages
performs poorly: the goal of such strategies is not to maximize
their own score, but rather to impose a certain relationship
between the payoffs, thus violating the implicit assumption
that the opponent is maximizing its own interest. Interestingly,
the model unit does not perform badly, showing that Tages did
build an almost reliable model.
TABLE VI
PERFORMANCE AGAINST “ZERO-DETERMINANT” STRATEGIES: AVERAGE
PAYOFFS PER TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND STANDARD
DEVIATION OVER 10 GAMES).
Strategy Tages Opponent Model
P Pσ P Pσ E Eσ
EXT2 1.36 0.40 1.67 0.60 0.74 0.27
ZDE 1.18 0.22 1.64 0.70 0.78 0.28
ZDF 1.98 0.08 2.14 0.15 0.46 0.21
ZDG 2.78 0.15 2.57 0.32 0.82 0.15
Finally, to assess the performance against an highly adaptive
opponent, Table VII reports the match of independent copies
of Tages. Four different experiments were performed: one
against an identical copy of the program, using exactly the
same parameters specified in Table I. Then, three experiments
against impaired copies: one allowed to evolve only for one
tenth of the generations (G = 30); one using one tenth of
the individuals (µ = 10); and one using one tenth of the
individuals for one tenth of the generations (G = 30 and
µ = 10).
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE AGAINST TAGES VITH DIFFERENT PARAMETERS:
AVERAGE PAYOFFS PER TURN AND MODEL EFFICACY (AVERAGE AND
STANDARD DEVIATION OVER 10 GAMES).
Parameters Tages Opponent Model
G µ P Pσ P Pσ E Eσ
300 100 1.41 0.12 1.37 0.11 0.23 0.08
30 100 1.30 0.14 1.32 0.12 0.08 0.06
300 10 1.49 0.15 1.38 0.15 0.12 0.05
30 10 1.62 0.11 2.06 0.13 0.32 0.09
The problems of co-evolution are well known both in zero-
and nonzero-sum games [?], and Tages performance are not
particularly good in this scenario. In the long run, it adopts
an always-defect strategy, and, consequently, models the other
self as AC. Thus, it may be concluded that Tages cannot be
reliably modeled by itself.
Interestingly, however, the copy with the most impaired
modeling unit is the one with the best performances. Thus,
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Fig. 3. Alternative models for Hard Tit for Tat (w = 3). Only the rightmost one is exact, nevertheless all models are functional: Tages correctly predicts its
next move more than 95% of the times, and the brute-force analyzer suggests to always cooperate. See Fig. 2 for the definition of the symbols.
Fig. 4. Alternative models produced for the Omega Tit for Tat. Tages may
recognize it as a simple Tit for Tat and cooperates. In some match, however,
the opponent reaches the sink state 3 and the game cannot be recovered. See
Fig. 2 for the definition of the symbols.
counter intuitively, the victory goes to whoever has the more
simple model to represent an opponent. This can be explained,
because impairing the model optimization results in far more
simple ND-FSMs (three or four nodes, on average, against
some tens of nodes). Such tiny models are, actually, more use-
ful in the scenario: they are not overfitted, and the playing unit
often resorts to its effective heuristic, generating a weighted
random move (see Section V-C).
Remarkably, using G = 30 and µ = 10 would lower the
overall performances. There is an evident relationship between
the complexity of the opponent and the optimal complexity of
the model. Tages tries to limit the complexity of its models
according to the percentage of correct predictions using the
internal threshold ζ, but this might not be effective enough
when facing highly-complex strategies.
D. Round-Robin Tournaments
Following the methodology proposed in [?], the perfor-
mances of Tages were assessed in round-robin tournaments:
several random tournaments are played, each confronting
exactly N different strategies randomly selected from the ones
listed in table VIII. Similarly to Axelrod’s, in the tournaments
all players are matched against all others for five different
games, and the total payoff collected during all games was
considered as the final score. The player with the highest score
is considered the winner of the tournaments.
The sizes of the tournaments ranged from five to thirty
in steps of five. For each given size, one hundred thousand
different tournaments were simulated. As other players, Tages
was selected only in a fraction of the tournaments. Table VIII
reports the percentages of tournaments won by the different
players over the tournaments they participate into, and Table
IX shows more details about the conduct in the single matches.
Tages is consistently able to win the majority of tournaments
it takes part in. No other strategy has a similar performance,
Generous Tit for Tat and Omega Tit for Tat are the only other
players able to reach acceptable results in all tournament sizes,
but their percentages of victories are a fraction of Tages’.
Some players, like Omega Tit for Tat and Soft Majority,
show good performances in small tournaments only. Such
strategies may be able to score more points than their op-
ponents in one-to-one confrontations, but also reduce both
payoffs. Thus, over several matches, they are likely to receive
a smaller total payoff.
Following the idea of Axelrod’s round-robin tournaments,
Tages optimizes its global payoff and not the number of games
it scores more than its opponent. Indeed, the mechanisms of
reconciliation and exploration was added to this precise end:
despite the fact that the model is highly effective, Tages may
choose a sub-optimal move hoping to increase its global payoff
in the long run.
Increasing the number of random strategies, for instance
adding opponents from Table II or Table III, would further
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TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE IN ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS: PERCENTAGE OF
VICTORIES IN THE DISPUTED TOURNAMENTS (AVERAGE OVER 100, 000
RANDOM TOURNAMENTS FOR EACH TOURNAMENT SIZE).
Player Tournament size5 10 15 20 25 30
2TFT 12.4 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
AC 28.1 10.4 2.8 0.5 0.0 0.0
AD 19.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ADP 33.0 17.1 7.7 2.4 0.3 0.0
APAV 19.5 5.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
ATFT 29.4 10.3 3.5 0.7 0.1 0.0
CTFT 20.3 6.7 2.2 0.6 0.1 0.0
EXT2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FBF 19.7 6.7 2.2 0.6 0.1 0.0
FRT3 12.1 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
FRT4 15.1 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
GRD 26.5 14.3 6.8 2.4 0.5 0.0
GRM 19.5 7.7 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
GTFT  = 0.05 32.5 25.4 18.9 12.4 6.4 2.6
GTFT  = 0.1 36.3 33.1 29.4 23.1 16.7 10.5
GTFT  = 0.33 40.0 36.0 31.4 25.0 18.1 10.8
HM 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HTF2T 26.4 9.2 2.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
HTFT2 13.2 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
HTFT3 17.9 3.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
NP 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OTFT 36.2 30.3 27.3 22.9 15.6 6.9
PAV 29.4 11.5 3.6 0.7 0.1 0.0
PRO 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RND 6.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RP  = 0.01 6.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RP  = 0.1 5.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RTFT 11.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SG 25.2 12.7 6.3 2.7 0.8 0.1
SM 36.5 20.9 11.8 5.6 1.8 0.3
STF2T 31.3 12.0 3.5 0.8 0.1 0.0
STFT 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tages 75.5 75.7 78.7 82.8 87.2 92.4
TFT 18.6 5.0 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0
ZDE 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ZDF 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ZDG 22.4 8.9 2.9 0.6 0.1 0.0
boost the advantage of Tages, as it can be seen from the global
results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper presented Tages, an adaptive player for the IPD.
Differently from similar strategies, it does not require a set of
pre-determined archetypes to choose from, nor any distinction
between exploration and exploitation phases. During the game
Tages builds a model of its current adversary as a ND-FSM,
and, at the same time, exploits it to push the game into the
most favorable line of exchanges. Models are created from
scratch and optimized by an EA to be coherent, competitive
and compact. Such models need to be functional in predicting
the opponent’s replies, rather than to be exact or complete.
Experimental results demonstrated that Tages is consistently
able to prevail in tournaments of different sizes against strong
opponents taken from the literature. As Tages’s goal is to max-
imize its own payoff, regardless of the score of the opponent,
in one-to-one matches it overcame some two-thirds of the
players. But its performances in round-robin competitions are
thirty-five or more percentage points better than all the other
strategies.
Experimental evidence also suggests that increasing the
complexity and size of the models is not beneficial, as the
ND-FSMs get more coherent with the past record of the game
but less effective at predicting its future development. This
phenomenon could be similar to the overfitting problem in
linear regression. For this reason, Tages included a very tight
mechanism to prevent bloating.
Similarly, decreasing the complexity and size of the models
would reduce the effectiveness against all opponents that are
correctly modeled. Indeed, changing significantly the internal
parameters, either strengthening or impairing the modeling
unit, is likely to decrease the performance in the tournaments.
However, self-adapting mechanisms for better tackling highly-
complex strategies could be added in future works.
Future works also include adapting Tages to evolutionary
IPD competitions, as getting more payoff than the opponent
in each match could be significantly different from getting the
total highest payoff.
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APPENDIX
2TFT (Two Tits For Tat) — Cooperates unless the opponent
defects. To retort, it defects twice. Then, if the opponent
cooperated, it starts cooperating again.
AC (Always Cooperate) — Always cooperates.
AD (Always Defect) — Always defects.
ADP (Adaptive) — Starts with a sequence of five consec-
utive cooperations, followed by five defections; from the 11th
turn, it chooses the move that has been most profitable so far.
APAV (Adaptive Pavlov) — Categorizes the opponent’s
behavior using four classes, and then plays accordingly. If the
opponent is fully cooperative, APAV behaves like a simple
TFT; if it is almost cooperative, APAV plays Soft Tit for Two
Tats in order to recover mutual cooperation; if aggressive or
random, APAV always defects. To categorize the opponent,
APAV plays six turns as TFT. If the opponent started with a
cooperation, it is identified as fully cooperative; if the opponent
defected three times, it is identified as almost cooperative;
if the opponent defected four or more times, it is identified
as aggressive; in all other cases, the opponent is considered
random. In order to deal with the situations in which the
opponents may change their actions, the average payoff is
computed every six turns. If it is lower than R, the process
of opponent identification is restarted.
ATFT (Adaptive Tit for Tat) — Updates the variable w in
[0, 1] according to the opponent’s moves: w is slowly pushed
toward 1 on cooperations, toward 0 on defections. At each
turn, if w ≥ 0.5 ATFT cooperates; otherwise, it defects. The
initial value are w = 0.5 and r = 0.99 for the adaption rate.
CCD (Periodically CCD) — Cooperates twice and then
defects; then repeats the pattern.
13http://www.hpc.polito.it
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CD (Periodically CD) — Cooperates and then defects; then
repeats the pattern.
CS (Collective Strategy) — Starts cooperating and defects
in the second turn. If the opponent played the same moves,
CS starts behaving as TFT; otherwise, it plays AD.
CTFT (Contrite Tit for Tat) — Same as TFT when there is
no noise. In a noisy environment, once it receives T because
of an error, it will choose cooperate twice in order to recover
mutual cooperation.
DDC (Periodically DDC) — Defects twice and then coop-
erates; then repeats the pattern.
EXT2 (Zero-Determinant Extort-2) — Let SZD be the
total payoff earned by the ZD strategy, and So the one
of its opponent, the strategy imposes the linear relationship
SZD−P = 2 ·(So−P). That is, guarantees to EXT2 twice the
share of payoffs above the “punishment” threshold, compared
to those received by the current opponent.
FBF (Firm But Fair) — Cooperates on the first turn, and
cooperates except after receiving a S payoff.
FRT3 (Fortress3) — Tries to recognize a kin member by
playing the sequence defect, defect, cooperate. If the opponent
plays the same sequence, it cooperates until the opponent
defects. Otherwise, it defects until the opponent defects on
continuous two moves, and then it cooperates on the following
move.
FRT4 (Fortress4) — Tries to recognize the opponent by
playing the sequence defect, defect, defect, cooperate. If the
opponent plays the same sequence, it cooperates until the
opponent defects. Otherwise, if it does not recognize the
opponent as a friend, it defects until the opponent defects for
three consecutive moves, then cooperates on the next.
FS (Fair strategy) — Defects with a probability p equals to
the frequency of defections played by the opponent; cooperates
with probability 1 − p. In the first turns the probability is
smoothed towards 0.5.
GRD (Gradual) — Cooperates on the first turn, and co-
operates as long as the opponent cooperates; after the first
defection of the other player, it defects one time and cooperates
2 times; ... after the n-th defection, it reacts with n consecutive
defections and then plays two cooperate moves.
GRM (Grim Trigger) — cooperates until the opponent
defects, and subsequently always defects. The strategy is also
known as Grudger or Spiteful.
GTFT (Generous Tit for Tat) — Acts as a simple TFT,
except that it cooperates with a probability q instead of
just retaliating after the opponent defects. The parameter 
is usually small, typically  = 0.1. Some authors propose
 = min(1 − T−RR−S , R−PT−P ), i.e.,  = 0.33 with the standard
payoff matrix. The strategy is also known as Naı¨ve Peace
Maker or Soft Joss.
HM (Hard Majority) — Defects on the first turn, and
defects if the number of defections of the opponent is greater
than or equal to the number of times it has cooperated;
otherwise it cooperates.
HS (Handshake) — Defects on the first turn and cooperates
on the second. If the opponent behaves the same, it always
cooperates. Otherwise, it always defects.
HTF2T (Hard Tit For Two Tats) — Cooperates unless the
opponent plays two consecutive defections, then keeps defect-
ing unless the adversary plays two consecutive cooperations.
Then it starts cooperating again, and so on.
HTFT2 (Hard Tit for Tat (2-turn window) — Cooperates on
the first turn, then defects only if the opponent has defected in
any of the previous two turns. As some sources report the size
of the window to be three turns instead of two, both versions
have been included here.
HTFT3 (Hard Tit for Tat (3-turn window) — Cooperates
on the first turn, then defects only if the opponent has defected
in any of the previous three turns. See the discussion on the
previous entry.
NP (Naı¨ve Prober) — Acts as simple TFT, but defects
unprovoked with a probability . The parameter  is usually
small, typically  = 0.1. The strategy is also known as Hard
Joss.
OTFT (Omega Tit for Tat) — Normally behaves like TFT,
but it is ready to play an extra cooperation for breaking
deadlocks, i.e., two interlaced sequences of d alternating coop-
eration/defection. Moreover, OTFT measures the randomness
of the opponent counting the number of times it changes
behavior, and turns to an Always Defect if the value exceeds
a given threshold t. Typically, d = 3 and t = 8.
PAV (Pavlov) — Cooperates on the first turn; if a payoff
of R or T is received in the last turn then repeats last choice,
otherwise chooses the opposite one.
PRO (Prober) — Starts with a sequence of one defection
followed by two cooperations. If the opponent cooperated in
the second and third turn, it keeps defecting for the rest of the
game; otherwise, it plays as TFT.
RND (Random Player) — Randomly chooses between
cooperation and defection with equal probability, with no
memory of previous exchanges.
RP (Remorseful Prober) — Acts as simple TFT, but occa-
sionally defects with a probability . Unlike Naı¨ve Prober,
however, it does not retort if the opponent defects after
its unfair move. The parameter  is usually small, typically
 = 0.1.
RTFT (Reverse Tit for Tat) — Starts defecting, and then
chooses the opposite of the opponent’s previous action. This
apparently illogical variant of Tit for Tat is also known as
Psycho.
SGS (Southampton Group strategies) — A group of strate-
gies are designed to recognize each other through a predeter-
mined sequence of 5-10 moves at the start. Once two SGSs
recognize each other, they will act as a master or slave - a
master will always defect while a slave will always cooperate
in order for the master to win the maximum points. If the
opponent is not recognized as SGS, it will behave like an AD
to minimize the score of the opponent.
SG (Soft Grudger) — Cooperates until the opponent de-
fects. In this case, it punishes the behavior with a sequence
of four defections. Then, it offers a peace agreement with two
consecutive moves of cooperation.
SM (Soft Majority) — Cooperates on the first turn, and
cooperates as long as the number of times the opponent has
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cooperated is greater than or equal to the number of times it
has defected; otherwise, it defects.
STF2T (Soft Tit For Two Tats) — Cooperates unless the
opponent plays two consecutive defections.
STFT (Suspicious Tit for Tat) — starts defecting, and then
replicates the opponent’s previous action. The strategy is also
known as Evil Tit For Tat.
TFT (Tit for Tat) — Cooperates on the first turn, copies the
opponent’s last move afterwards.
ZDE (Zero-Determinant Extort) — let SZD be the total
payoff earned by the ZD strategy, and So the one of its
opponent, the strategy imposes the linear relationship SZD +
P = 3 · (So − P).
ZDF (Zero-Determinant Fixed Score) — let SZD be the
total payoff earned by the ZD strategy, and So the one of
its opponent, the strategy tries to fix the opponent’s score to
a pre-determined value g. Usually, with the standard payoff
matrix, g = 2.
ZDG (Zero-Determinant Generous) — let SZD be the total
payoff earned by the ZD strategy, and So the one of its oppo-
nent, the strategy enforces the relationship SZD = 2 ·(So−R)
between the two strategies’ scores. Compared to EXT2, it
offers the opponent a higher portion of the payoffs.
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